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Abstract  20!
Adults and children are willing to sacrifice personal gain to avoid both disadvantageous  21!
and  advantageous  inequity.  These  two  forms  of  inequity  aversion  follow  different  22!
developmental trajectories, with disadvantageous inequity aversion emerging around 4  23!
years and advantageous inequity aversion emerging around 8 years. Although inequity  24!
aversion is assumed to be specific to situations where resources are distributed among  25!
individuals,  the  role  of  social  context  has  not  been  tested  in  children.  Here,  we  26!
investigated the influence of two aspects of social context on inequity aversion in 4- to 9- 27!
year-old  children:  (1)  the  role  of  the  experimenter  distributing  rewards  and  (2)  the  28!
presence  of  a  peer  with  whom  rewards  could  be  shared.  Experiment  1  showed  that  29!
children rejected inequity at the same rate, regardless of whether the experimenter had  30!
control over reward allocations. This indicates that children’s decisions are based upon  31!
reward allocations between themselves and a peer and are not attempts to elicit more  32!
favorable  distributions  from  the  experimenter.  Experiment  2  compared  rejections  of  33!
unequal reward allocations in children interacting with or without a peer partner. When  34!
faced with a disadvantageous distribution, children frequently rejected a smaller reward  35!
when a larger reward was visible, even if no partner would obtain the larger reward. This  36!
suggests  that  nonsocial  factors  partly  explain  disadvantageous  inequity  rejections.  37!
However, rejections of disadvantageous distributions were higher when the larger amount  38!
would  go  to  a  peer,  indicating  that  social  context  enhances  disadvantageous  inequity  39!
aversion. By contrast, children rejected advantageous distributions almost exclusively in  40!
the social context. Therefore, advantageous inequity aversion appears to be genuinely  41!
social, highlighting its potential relevance for the development of fairness concerns. By  42!
comparing  social  and  nonsocial  factors,  this  study  provides  a  detailed  picture  of  the  43!
expression  of  inequity  aversion  in  human  ontogeny  and  raises  questions  about  the  44!
function and evolution of inequity aversion in humans.    45!! 3!
Introduction  46!
The  occurrence  of  extensive  cooperation  in  human  societies  creates  numerous  47!
opportunities  for  exploitation  by  free  riders  [1-3].  In  order  to  avoid  being  exploited,  48!
individuals must regulate their contributions to cooperative endeavors by attending to  49!
their payoffs relative to those of social partners. In line with this reasoning, human adults  50!
show a strong aversion to inequitable payoff distributions, i.e. they sacrifice personal gain  51!
in order to avoid inequity [4]. For example, in the ultimatum game, people often reject  52!
allocations  of  resources  that  place  them  at  a  disadvantage  relative  to  a  partner  (i.e.  53!
disadvantageous  inequity),  preferring  nothing  to  a  small  relative  reward  [5].  This  54!
behavior violates rational choice models that predict that people should accept any non- 55!
zero offer of a desirable resource [6]. More surprisingly, in some situations adults also  56!
reject advantageous allocations in which they receive more than a peer (advantageous  57!
inequity) [4, 7-8]. Despite some variation, an aversion to unequal resource distributions  58!
has been established in a wide variety of cultural communities [9-11], demonstrating the  59!
apparent ubiquity of inequity aversion across human populations.  60!
Research on children and nonhuman animals demonstrates that inequity aversion  61!
is not restricted to human adults. Studies of children show that sensitivity to inequity is an  62!
important feature of early development [12-13] and point to an intriguing asymmetry in  63!
the development of children’s aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous inequity.  64!
Recent studies have found that children as young as 3 years of age develop an aversion to  65!
disadvantageous  inequity  [14-17]  but  do  not  develop  an  aversion  to  advantageous  66!
inequity until later, around 8 years of age [14, 18]. In addition to developmental studies,  67!
experiments on nonhuman animals have raised the question of whether inequity aversion  68!
is unique to humans and have demonstrated that some nonhuman animals are sensitive to  69!
disadvantageous resource distributions [19-30]. These studies suggest that an aversion to  70!
disadvantageous inequity may have deep evolutionary roots. As yet, however, no study  71!
has  directly  tested  advantageous  inequity  aversion  in  nonhumans  and  thus  there  is  72!
currently  no  evidence  that  nonhuman  animals  are  averse  to  advantageously  unequal  73!
allocations (see Brosnan et al., 2010 [30] for an indirect test of advantageous inequity  74!
aversion in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes). Together, results from studies of children and  75!! 4!
nonhuman animals suggest that separate evolutionary and developmental mechanisms  76!
underlie the two forms of inequity aversion.   77!
Empirical  demonstrations  of  inequity  aversion  across  adults,  children  and  78!
nonhuman animals raise the question of how inequity aversion could have evolved, given  79!
that it motivates individuals to sacrifice personal gain. Theories to explain the evolution  80!
and expression of inequity aversion can be broadly grouped under two hypotheses. First,  81!
the Social Hypothesis [4, 31-32] suggests that inequity aversion is specific to the social  82!
domain  and  evolved  as  a  means  of  regulating  contributions  to,  and  payoffs  from,  83!
cooperative  interactions.  According  to  this  hypothesis  an  aversion  to  inequity  allows  84!
individuals to ensure that they are not contributing more or less to cooperative activities  85!
than  fellow  cooperators  and  thus  protects  individuals  from  being  exploited  and  from  86!
exploiting others. Second, the Nonsocial Hypothesis suggests that inequity aversion is a  87!
result of domain-general mechanisms such as reference dependence and loss aversion  88!
that allows individuals to gauge their own payoffs relative to expected payoffs [33-35].  89!
According  to  the  Nonsocial  Hypothesis,  inequity  aversion  may  operate  in  social  90!
interactions but did not necessarily evolve for social interactions per se. Sensitivity to  91!
lower-than-expected payoffs may indeed be useful even in non-cooperative contexts. For  92!
example, an attention to how one’s payoffs compare to available payoffs, including those  93!
of conspecifics, could confer a benefit in a foraging context where individuals can alter  94!
foraging strategies based on information about what payoffs can be expected in a given  95!
environment [33].   96!
The  Social  and  Nonsocial  hypotheses  generate  different  predictions.  First,  97!
according to the Social Hypothesis, rejections of unequal allocations should occur only  98!
when resources are divided between social partners. Furthermore, individuals should only  99!
reject unequal allocations when their rejections affect their partner’s payoff and not when  100!
their  partner’s  payoff  is  fixed  relative  to  their  own.  According  to  the  Nonsocial  101!
Hypothesis, rejections of unequal allocations can occur even when there is no social  102!
partner.  However,  they  should  occur  only  in  disadvantageous  situations  (i.e.  small  103!
rewards will be less desirable when a larger possible reward is present for comparison)  104!
and  not  in  advantageous  situations  where  one’s  payoff  is  already  better  than  other  105!
available payoffs.  106!! 5!
Distinguishing  these  hypotheses  is  critical  to  determining  why  humans  show  107!
inequity aversion and to understanding the relationship between inequity aversion and  108!
fairness. Additionally, testing nonsocial influences on inequity aversion can shed light on  109!
the  processes  supporting  the  human  aversion  to  disadvantageous  and  advantageous  110!
inequality.  If  disadvantageous  inequity  aversion  is  specifically  social,  then  it  is  most  111!
likely linked to fairness concerns (i.e., it is not fair that I have less than someone else) and  112!
may thus have evolved for cooperation. However, if disadvantageous inequity aversion is  113!
a nonsocial response then it may not be tightly linked to fairness and may instead be  114!
related  to  maximizing  personal  rewards  relative  to  available  rewards.  By  contrast,  115!
advantageous inequity aversion should be specifically social and, as such, may represent  116!
a strong concern for fairness.   117!
Only one study of inequity aversion in humans has directly compared a social  118!
with a nonsocial condition in a human allocation game.  Sanfey et al. [36] found that  119!
rejections in the ultimatum game were higher when disadvantageous unequal offers were  120!
made by a human partner compared to a nonsocial condition where similar ‘offers’ were  121!
made by a computer. Notably, however, individuals also rejected many unequal offers  122!
made by the computer, even though no human partner would have received the better  123!
deal if the offer had been accepted. Thus, rejections of inequitable offers were stronger in  124!
a social context, suggesting that social influences play an important role in the expression  125!
of  inequity  aversion  in  human  adults.  However,  results  from  Sanfey  et  al  [36]  126!
demonstrate  that  inequity  aversion  in  human  adults  is  not  necessarily  restricted  to  127!
situations where participants are interacting with a partner.   128!
In contrast to studies of human adults, studies of inequity aversion in nonhuman  129!
animals have carefully examined the degree to which inequity aversion is specific to the  130!
social domain. Indeed, this issue has been discussed extensively because it is essential for  131!
the broader question of whether nonhuman primates demonstrate inequity aversion and, if  132!
so, whether animal inequity aversion is comparable to that of humans [19, 25, 31-32, 37].  133!
One frequently cited experiment provides a useful example that is representative of the  134!
majority of animal inequity aversion tasks. In the first study of inequity aversion in a  135!
nonhuman species, Brosnan and de Waal [19] gave pairs of female capuchin monkeys  136!
(Cebus apella) equal payoffs or unequal payoffs in return for trading a token. Results  137!! 6!
showed that participants were least likely to trade a token when their partner received a  138!
high value reward for free while they had to trade a token for a low value food item.  139!
However, participants also showed high refusals in a nonsocial condition, where high  140!
value food was placed in an adjacent cage and they were given the option to trade for a  141!
low value item. The fact that participants refused trading opportunities in a nonsocial  142!
condition showed that while inequity aversion might be moderated by social context, it  143!
was not specific to the social context. Furthermore, offers were produced by a third party  144!
(i.e. the experimenter) and rejections did not actually affect the social partner’s payoff  145!
[37].  Given  this,  participants  may  have  used  rejections  to  elicit  more  favorable  146!
distributions from the experimenter.   147!
As  illustrated  in  the  example  above,  Brosnan  and  de  Waal’s  [19]  study  and  148!
several  similar  nonhuman  animal  studies  of  inequity  aversion  have  failed  to  provide  149!
strong support for the Social Hypothesis for two reasons. First, rejections of unequal  150!
offers are found regularly in nonsocial contexts [19-21, 24-26]. Second, animal tasks are  151!
typically designed such that recipients receive their payoffs regardless of the deciders’  152!
decision [19-27, 37]. Thus, it is unclear why deciders would reject unequal offers given  153!
that, unlike human studies of inequity aversion, rejections do not affect the overall payoff  154!
distribution.  One  possibility  is  that  rejections  are  simply  a  means  of  influencing  the  155!
distributer (i.e. the experimenter) that participants desire a better reward.  156!
Results from nonhuman animal studies raise important methodological concerns  157!
for the study of inequity aversion in humans. Manipulations of the social context and of  158!
the role of the experimenter are essential for understanding the mechanisms that underlie  159!
rejections of personal gain in reaction to inequity. Indeed, manipulations of this kind are  160!
critical  to  testing  the  Social  and  Nonsocial  hypotheses  for  the  evolution  of  inequity  161!
aversion.  162!
Taken together, results from animal inequity aversion studies and from Sanfey et  163!
al  (2003)  [36]  suggest  that  nonsocial  factors  may  influence  the  expression  of  164!
disadvantageous inequity aversion in humans and nonhuman species. What is currently  165!
unknown, however, is the extent to which the nonsocial dimension of inequity aversion is  166!
present in childhood. Furthermore, to understand whether social context differentially  167!
affects the expression of aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous inequity, it is  168!! 7!
essential to investigate the role of social influences on inequity aversion in a situation  169!
where  these  two  processes  are  separable.  Accordingly,  we  studied  the  role  of  social  170!
influences in the development of disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion in  171!
children, where an aversion to these two types of inequity follow different development  172!
trajectories.
  173!
To examine social influences on inequity aversion, we used a previously validated  174!
task: the Inequity Game [14]. The Inequity Game is a face-to-face task in which children  175!
are partnered with an unfamiliar peer. One child (the decider) decides whether to accept  176!
or reject allocations of candy, which are distributed by an experimenter. The decider’s  177!
decisions determine both their own and their partner’s payoffs. If a decider accepts an  178!
allocation,  both  children  receive  their  respective  payoffs.  If  a  decider  rejects  an  179!
allocation, neither child receives any rewards.   180!
The  current  study  consists  of  two  experiments.  Experiment  1  asks  whether  181!
children  reject  unequal  reward  allocations  in  an  effort  to  solicit  more  favorable  182!
allocations from the experimenter. According to the Social Hypothesis, children reject  183!
inequity in order to deprive a partner of advantageous or disadvantageous payoffs. This  184!
assumes that the main social interaction in the Inequity Game is between the decider and  185!
his or her partner. Alternatively, the main social interaction in the Inequity Game may be  186!
independent of the partner’s presence and may instead be between the decider and the  187!
experimenter. In this scenario, rejections of unequal allocations may be an attempt to  188!
influence  the  experimenter’s  allocation  decisions.  If  this  is  the  case,  deciders  should  189!
reject unequal allocations more frequently when the experimenter deliberately generates  190!
inequitable divisions of resources compared to when inequality is randomly generated.  191!
On the other hand, if children’s rejections are not intended to influence the experimenter,  192!
their  frequency  should  not  be  affected  by  whether  offers  are  made  deliberately  or  193!
randomly.  194!
Experiment 2 provides a direct test of the Social Hypothesis by testing children  195!
using  a  nonsocial  variation  of  the  Inequity  Game  in  which  there  is  no  recipient.  If  196!
inequity aversion in children is a specifically social phenomenon, we expect few, if any,  197!
rejections  in  the  nonsocial  version  of  the  game  regardless  of  whether  it  involves  198!
advantageous or disadvantageous inequity. However, if the Nonsocial Hypothesis is true,  199!! 8!
children should continue to reject disadvantageous allocations in the same pattern as they  200!
did in the original, social version of the Inequity Game.    201!
  202!
General Method  203!
  204!
Inequity Game  205!
The method used in these studies closely follows that described in Blake and McAuliffe,  206!
2011 [14]. In the original Inequity Game two children sat face-to-face and were assigned  207!
one of two roles. One child (“decider”) controlled a pair of handles, which were used to  208!
make decisions, while the other child (the “partner” or “recipient”) sat across from the  209!
decider and could not reach the handles. The experimenter placed allocations of Skittles®  210!
on both sides of the apparatus (Fig. 1), always placing the candies on the recipient’s side  211!
first in order to ensure that the decider paid attention to the recipient’s payoff before  212!
perceiving their own.  213!
  Before starting the game the experimenter demonstrated how the handles work:  214!
the decider could accept the allocation by pulling the green handle which tilted the trays  215!
outwards, causing Skittles to fall into bowls on each side of the apparatus. The decider  216!
could  reject  the  allocation  by  pulling  the  red  handle,  which  caused  the  trays  to  tip  217!
inwards, causing Skittles to fall into the middle bowl, where neither child was able to  218!
obtain them. Participants were told that any Skittles that fell into their bowls could be  219!
taken home at the end of the game but that neither they nor their partner would take home  220!
the  Skittles  in  the  middle  bowl.  Children  were  asked  to  move  Skittles  into  two  side  221!
bowls, located beside the apparatus, so that they could track the candies accumulating in  222!
each other’s bowls. Each side bowl was clearly associated with one of the participants.  223!
After the game was explained in this way, the participants were given practice trials to  224!
ensure that they understood the apparatus, including the effects of pulling both handles.  225!
The  practice  trials  were  as  follows:  1-1  (one  for  decider,  one  for  recipient);  0-1  226!
(disadvantageous inequity; none for decider, one for recipient) and 1-0 (advantageous  227!
inequity; one for decider, none for recipient). If a participant accepted all warm-up trials,  228!
they were given an extra 1-1 trial and asked to try the red handle. Children were not  229!
instructed to stay silent during the game. Participants’ parents were in the vicinity of the  230!! 9!
testing area and could watch the game but could not interfere (sessions were excluded in  231!
the case of parental interference, see below).  232!
  233!
Design  234!
Participants  for  Experiments  1  and  2  were  recruited  in  public  parks  around  Boston  235!
between  July  2009  and  August  2010.  Participants  were  pseudo-randomly  assigned  to  236!
experiment.  237!
     238!
Analyses  239!
All statistical analyses were conducted with R statistical software (version 2.15.2) [38].  240!
Decision data were analyzed using Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs) with a  241!
binary response term (accept or reject) [39]. Mixed models were run using the package  242!
‘lme4’ [40]. In all models participant identity (ID) was fit as a random effect to control  243!
for repeated measures.   244!
Our GLMM procedure was as follows: (1) we examined a null model, which  245!
included participant ID as the only explanatory variable to test how much variation in the  246!
response term could be accounted for by individual variation; (2) we created a full model,  247!
which  included  predictor  variables  and  all  two-way  interactions  between  Distribution  248!
(equal vs. unequal) and the other predictor variables (see Table 1 for a description of  249!
predictor variables); (3) the full model was compared to the null model using a likelihood  250!
ratio test (LRT) to test whether the inclusion of predictors provided a better fit to the data  251!
than participant ID alone. Unless otherwise noted, full models provided a better fit to data  252!
than null models; (4) a minimal model was created from the full model by sequentially  253!
dropping single terms from the model and testing whether their inclusion improved the  254!
model fit using likelihood ratio tests.   255!
To examine whether children’s decision varied over test trials, we used Wilcoxon  256!
signed-rank tests. Results from trial analyses were not significant unless reported. All  257!
tests were two-tailed and alpha was set at 0.05. Figures show raw data and were created  258!
using the ‘ggplot2’ package [41]. Binomial confidence intervals were calculated using the  259!
Agresti-Coull method [42].   260!
  261!! 10!
Ethics  262!
This  study  was  approved  by  Harvard  University’s  Committee  on  the  Use  of  Human  263!
Subjects in Research. Guardians of participants gave informed consent in writing before  264!
children participated in the study.    265!
  266!
  267!
Experiment 1: Are Children Attempting To Influence The Experimenter?  268!
  269!
We tested whether children were more likely to accept unfair offers that were not under  270!
the experimenter’s control compared to those that were under the experimenter’s control.  271!
To this end, we performed the Inequity Game with a decider and a partner sitting face-to- 272!
face and we manipulated the origin of the offers such that half of the trial distributions  273!
were deliberately determined by the experimenter (hereafter, “deliberate” offers) while  274!
the  other  half  of  trial  distributions  were  randomly  determined  by  cards  (hereafter,  275!
“random” offers) that had different distributions printed on them (see Fig. S1 for an  276!





Children  aged  4-9  were  recruited  in  public  parks  in  the  Boston  area.  Parents  were  282!
approached and asked if their child would be interested in participating in a game where  283!
she/he gets to take home candy. If parents consented, children were escorted to a testing  284!
area containing the Inequity Game test apparatus. We tested a total of 124 pairs (decider  285!
age  range  4;0-9;9,  59  female  deciders).  Participant  information  for  Experiment  1  is  286!
reported  in  Table  S1.  An  additional  16  participants  were  tested  but  excluded  due  to  287!
experimenter error (13), parental interference (2) or discomfort (1).  288!
  289!
  290!
Design  291!! 11!
Children were assigned to one of two conditions: disadvantageous inequity (N=64, 26  292!
female deciders) or advantageous inequity (N=60, 33 female deciders). Allocation origin  293!
(deliberate or random) and distribution (equal or unequal) were tested within participants,  294!
and inequity type (advantageous or disadvantageous) was a between-subject factor. This  295!
meant that each pair of children received three deliberate equal allocations (1-1), three  296!
deliberate unequal allocations (either disadvantageous, 1-4, or, advantageous, 4-1), three  297!
random  equal  allocations  (1-1)  and  three  random  unequal  allocations  (either  298!
disadvantageous, 1-4, or, advantageous, 4-1). Allocation origin was blocked so that pairs  299!
received six random allocations followed by six deliberate allocations or vice versa, with  300!
equal and unequal trials randomized within block.   301!
  302!
Procedure  303!
Before administering the randomly generated allocations, the experimenter showed the  304!
participants the cards and explained how they determined the distribution. The decider  305!
was then asked two questions to make sure she/he understood that the allocations were  306!
not under the experimenter’s control. First, the experimenter asked the child “Do you  307!
know what the next card will be?” and then “Do I know what the next card will be?” If a  308!
participant  did  not  say  “no”  to  these  two  questions,  the  experimenter  stated  that  the  309!
distribution would be a surprise for everyone. The majority of children spontaneously  310!
answered  these  questions  correctly.  However,  24  children  did  not  (17  children  in  311!
disadvantageous inequity; 7 children in advantageous; 19% of total sample). The pattern  312!
of our results held regardless of whether these children were included in analyses (see  313!
Table S5 and Fig. S4). On each random allocation trial, the experimenter revealed the  314!
card to the child and distributed Skittles in accordance with the depicted allocation.  315!
If  parents  consented,  we  videotaped  sessions  (93%  of  sessions).  Data  were  316!
analyzed from video coding for these sessions (115 out of 124) and from live coding for  317!
the non-recorded sessions (9 sessions).   318!
  319!
Results  320!
Results  from  Experiment  1  are  shown  in  Fig.  2a  and  2b.  This  figure  illustrates  that  321!
children responded differently to the two types of inequality, rejecting more allocations in  322!! 12!
the disadvantageous inequity condition than in the advantageous inequity condition. In  323!
contrast, their rejections of equal allocations were similar across both conditions. This  324!
observed  interaction  between  Distribution  (equal  vs.  unequal)  and  Condition  325!
(disadvantageous  inequity  vs.  advantageous  inequity)  was  a  significant  predictor  of  326!
children’s decisions in our minimal model (LRT, X
2
1 = 123.97, P < 0.001). Because  327!
participants’  decisions  about  reward  allocations  differed  between  conditions,  all  328!
subsequent analyses were conducted separately for disadvantageous and advantageous  329!
inequity.   330!
Results from the disadvantageous inequity condition are shown in Fig. 2a. The  331!
main question motivating our analysis was whether children were more likely to reject  332!
disadvantageous,  unequal  allocations  that  were  deliberately,  as  opposed  to  randomly,  333!
generated. As Fig.2a shows, children did not distinguish between these two allocation  334!
origins. A full GLMM of children’s decisions in the disadvantageous inequity condition  335!
showed that the interaction between Origin and Distribution was not significant (LRT,  336!
X
2
1 = 2.45, P = 0.118). We thus dropped this interaction from the model when creating  337!
the minimal model and additionally asked whether there was a main effect of Origin.  338!
This factor was not a significant predictor of children’s decisions (LRT, X
2
1 = 0.23, P =  339!
0.635).  Given  that  the  origin  of  disadvantageous  inequity  allocations  did  not  affect  340!
children’s  decisions,  we  eliminated  both  the  Origin  and  Order  (deliberate  or  random  341!
block first) terms from our model.   342!
Our minimal model (see Table S2 for model output) showed that there were two  343!
significant predictors of participants’ decisions in the disadvantageous inequity condition:  344!
(1) an interaction between Distribution and Age group (LRT, X
2
2 = 35.19, P < 0.001) and  345!
(2) an interaction between Distribution and Decider gender (LRT, X
2
1 = 5.61, P = 0.018).   346!
Fig. 2a illustrates the interaction between Distribution and Age group: older children  347!
were more likely to reject unequal allocations than younger children but rejections of  348!
equal  offers  did  not  vary  with  age.  The  interaction  between  Decider  gender  and  349!
Distribution was due to the fact that males were slightly more likely to reject equal offers  350!
and slightly less likely to reject unequal offers than girls in the disadvantageous inequity  351!
condition (see Fig. S2 for a depiction of this interaction).  352!! 13!
  We  examined  participants’  decisions  in  the  advantageous  inequity  condition  353!
following  the  same  steps  as  outlined  above.  As  shown  in  Fig.  2b,  children  did  not  354!
distinguish  between  deliberately  generated  allocations  and  randomly  generated  355!
allocations. Indeed, GLMMs revealed that neither the interaction between Origin and  356!
Distribution nor the main effect of Origin were significant predictors of participants’  357!
decisions in the advantageous inequity condition (X
2
1 = 0.09, P = 0.766, X
2
1 = 0.22, P =  358!
0.638, respectively). Results from our minimal model showed that the only significant  359!
predictor  of  participants’  decisions  in  the  advantageous  inequity  condition  was  the  360!
interaction between Distribution and Age Group (LRT, X
2
2 = 20.77, P < 0.001; model  361!
output is shown in Table S2). Children across the three age groups were unlikely to reject  362!
equal offers and 4&5- and 6&7-year-olds rarely rejected advantageously unequal offers  363!
(see Fig. 2b). However, 8&9-year-olds tended to reject more unequal reward allocations  364!
than equal allocations.   365!
  366!
Discussion  367!
We found that children’s levels of rejections did not differ between unequal allocations  368!
that were deliberately generated by the experimenter and allocations that were randomly  369!
generated  by  cards.  Regardless  of  whether  the  distribution  of  rewards  was  randomly  370!
determined or chosen by the experimenter, 4- to 9-year-old children were likely to reject  371!
disadvantageous allocations. This suggests that children did not reject disadvantageous  372!
inequity in order to elicit more favorable distributions from the experimenter. Similarly,  373!
children  in  the  8&9-year-old  age  group  rejected  more  advantageous  allocations  than  374!
equal allocations, irrespective of whether the experimenter had control over allocations.  375!
This  result  is  congruent  with  Blake  and  McAuliffe  (2011)  [14]  in  showing  that  376!
advantageous inequity aversion emerges at 8-9 years. Further, our findings importantly  377!
extend  previous  work  by  showing  that  rejections  of  advantageous  allocations  are  a  378!
response to an unequal resource distribution between two peers and are not an attempt to  379!
influence the experimenter.   380!
  It is possible that children may not have understood the card manipulation and  381!
instead assumed that the experimenter was in control regardless of how allocations were  382!
determined. This seems unlikely because the majority of children (81%) answered our  383!! 14!
card  comprehension  questions  correctly,  confirming  that  they  understood  that  the  384!
experimenter did not know what the next allocation would be. Moreover, the pattern of  385!
our results held even when participants who did not correctly answer comprehension  386!
questions were excluded from analyses.  Furthermore, previous work shows that children  387!
between 4 and 9 years of age distinguish intentional from accidental outcomes and have a  388!
basic understanding of randomness [43-44]. Therefore, the most plausible interpretation  389!
of  our  results  appears  to  be  that  children’s  choices  were  guided  by  the  allocations  390!
themselves and not by knowledge of whether allocations had been determined by the  391!
experimenter or not.  392!
  Findings  from  Experiment  1  suggest  that  the  main  social  interaction  in  the  393!
Inequity Game is between the decider and the recipient as opposed to between the decider  394!
and the experimenter. This finding is also consistent with the idea that children reject  395!
reward  allocations  in  order  to  prevent  their  partner  from  receiving  a  more  desirable  396!
allocation  (disadvantageous  inequity)  or  a  less  desirable  allocation  (advantageous  397!
inequity). However, an alternative explanation for rejections in the Inequity Game is that  398!
children are opposed to the unequal reward allocations themselves. In other words, it is  399!
possible that children would reject unequal allocations regardless of whether or not they  400!
were paired with a social partner.   401!
Understanding  whether  children  are  responding  to  the  unequal  allocations  402!
themselves or to an unequal division of rewards between themselves and a partner will  403!
help  distinguish  between  the  Social  and  Nonsocial  hypotheses  for  the  expression  of  404!
inequity aversion. If children do indeed respond to the unequal allocations themselves,  405!
which is an alternative explanation for disadvantageous, but not advantageous inequity  406!
aversion, this result would be consistent with the Nonsocial Hypothesis. To address this  407!
alternative explanation for rejections of inequity, we conducted a nonsocial version of the  408!
Inequity Game in which children were faced with unequal outcomes in the absence of a  409!
social partner.  410!
  411!
Experiment 2: Do children reject inequity in a nonsocial game?  412!
  413!! 15!
The  goal  of  this  experiment  was  to  test  whether  children’s  rejections  of  unequal  414!
allocations in the Inequity Game are specific to situations in which deciders are paired  415!
with a social partner. To this end, we conducted the Inequity Game with a decider but no  416!
recipient. We reasoned that if children reject allocations due to an aversion to the unequal  417!
outcomes themselves, then rates of rejection in Experiment 2 should be indistinguishable  418!
from those observed in Experiment 1. However, if children are importantly influenced by  419!
the presence of a social partner, we should expect to see a difference in rates of rejections  420!




Participants and design  425!
We  tested  a  total  of  201  children  (107  females).  As  in  Experiment  1,  children  were  426!
assigned to one of two conditions: disadvantageous inequity (N = 98, 55 females; age  427!
range: 4;0-9;9); and advantageous inequity, N = 103, 52 females; age range: 4;0-9;8).  428!
Participant  information  for  Experiment  2  is  reported  in  Table  S1.  An  additional  five  429!
participants were tested but excluded due to experimenter error (2), session interruption  430!
(1), parental interference (1) or shyness (1).  431!
Children were given 3 warm-up trials and 12 test trials. Children participated in  432!
either  the  disadvantageous  inequity  condition  or  the  advantageous  inequity  condition  433!
(between-subject factor). In both conditions, the test trials were blocked so that children  434!
received a block of 6 equal trials (1-1, 1 for decider, 1 on the other tray) and a block of 6  435!
unequal trials (disadvantageous inequity: 1 for decider, 4 on other tray; advantageous  436!
inequity: 4 for decider, 1 on the other tray). Block order was counterbalanced across  437!
participants.   438!
  439!
Procedure  440!
Children were recruited in public parks, as described in Experiment 1. The instructions  441!
were the same as above except that, here, the experimenter said that the Skittles on the  442!
other side of the apparatus would go back into the bag at the end of the game. To test  443!
their understanding of this, children were asked where the Skittles on the other side of the  444!! 16!
apparatus would go at the end of the game. If children failed to spontaneously answer this  445!
question  correctly  (15  children;  7  children  in  disadvantageous  inequity  and  8  in  446!
advantageous inequity; 7.5% of total sample), the experimenter would restate that the  447!
Skittles went back in the bag at the end of the game. Excluding children who did not  448!
answer this question correctly did not change the pattern of our results.   449!
Video recordings were available for 98.5% of participants and unavailable for  450!
three participants for whom we did not have video consent. Data were analyzed from  451!
video coding for all but these sessions. Data from live coding were analyzed for the three  452!




Nonsocial Game  457!
Results from Experiment 2 are shown in Fig. 3a and b. Children responded differently to  458!
the two types of inequality, rejecting more unequal distributions in the disadvantageous  459!
inequity  condition  than  in  the  advantageous  inequity  condition.  By  contrast,  their  460!
rejections of equal distributions were similar across both conditions. As in Experiment 1,  461!
we  found  that  the  interaction  between  Condition  (disadvantageous  vs.  advantageous  462!
inequity) and Distribution (equal vs. unequal) was a significant predictor of children’s  463!
decisions (LRT, X
2
1 = 74.91, P < 0.001). Consequently, all subsequent analyses were  464!
conducted separately for disadvantageous and advantageous inequity conditions.   465!
Fig. 3a illustrates children’s probability of rejecting unequal compared to equal  466!
allocations in the disadvantageous inequity condition. Examination of this figure suggests  467!
that children in all age groups rejected more unequal offers (1-4) than equal offers (1-1).  468!
Furthermore, this figure indicates that older children were more likely to reject unequal  469!
offers than younger children. In contrast, rejections of equal offers were low overall, and  470!
stable across age groups. Indeed, our minimal model confirmed that interaction between  471!
Age Group and Distribution was a significant predictor of children’s decisions in the  472!
disadvantageous inequity condition (LRT, X
2
2 = 10.03, P = 0.007; see Table S3 for model  473!
output).   474!! 17!
Results for the advantageous inequity condition are shown in Fig. 3b. As this  475!
figure illustrates, children rarely rejected unequal offers that benefited them more (4-1).  476!
Indeed, neither Age Group nor Distribution predicted rejections in our game. Our GLMM  477!
analyses showed that a full model, including all predictors and two-way interactions with  478!
Distribution, provided only a marginally better fit to participants’ decision data than a  479!
null model that included participant ID as the sole explanatory term (X
2
9 = 16.51, P =  480!
0.057). This finding suggests that inter-individual variation accounted for almost as much  481!
variation in participant behavior as did predictor variables and participant ID combined.   482!
Our  minimal  model  showed  that  the  only  significant  predictor  of  children’s  483!
behavior was the order in which blocks of trials were presented (LRT, X
2
1 = 7.50, P =  484!
0.006; see Table S3 for model output). This order effect was due to the fact that children  485!
who received the 4-1 block first rejected more trials overall (mean rejections overall =  486!
1.2, mean rejections of 1-1 = 1.4, mean rejections of 4-1 = 1.0) compared to children who  487!
received the 1-1 block first (mean rejections overall = .65, mean rejections of 1-1 = .66,  488!
mean rejections of 4-1 = .64).  489!
We were interested in whether children’s decisions varied across trials. To test  490!
this, we performed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on participants’ first three unequal trials  491!
compared  to  their  last  three  unequal  trials.  We  also  examined  whether  participants’  492!
decisions about equal trials varied across trials using these same comparisons. Separate  493!
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were performed for each age group within each condition  494!
(see  Fig.  S3  for  a  graph  showing  decisions  over  trials).  In  two  cases,  we  found  a  495!
significant difference between the first and second block of three unequal trials. Children  496!
in the 6&7-year-old age group were less likely to reject disadvantageously unequal trials  497!
in the second group of three trials compared to the first group of three trials (W = 833, P  498!
= 0.030). Similarly, children in the 8&9-year-old age group were less likely to reject  499!
disadvantageously unequal allocations in later trials (W = 269.5, P = 0.049). None of the  500!
other comparisons showed a significant difference between the first three and second  501!
three trials (Ps > 0.2).  502!
  503!
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 compared  504!! 18!
To examine whether children rejected more disadvantageous inequity and advantageous  505!
inequity offers in the social version of the game (i.e., when they were paired with a  506!
partner) than the nonsocial game, we compared results from Experiments 1 and 2. Figure  507!
4a-d illustrate children’s probability of rejection in the social and nonsocial versions of  508!
the  Inequity  Game.  Children’s  rejections  are  shown  separately  by  condition  and  509!
distribution to reflect our method of analysis.   510!
To  address  the  question  of  whether  rejections  varied  by  social  context  (i.e.  511!
Experiment 1 or Experiment 2), we conducted four separate GLMMs that each tested  512!
whether  participants’  decisions  were  predicted  by  an  interaction  between  Experiment  513!
(social, i.e. Experiment 1 or nonsocial, i.e. Experiment 2) and Age group. For the equal  514!
allocations, results from these models showed that children’s rejections did not depend on  515!
social context (see Table S4 for model output). The interaction between Age group and  516!
Experiment was not significant for either the disadvantageous inequity or advantageous  517!
inequity  condition  (disadvantageous  inequity:  X
2
2  =  4.05,  P  =  0.132;  advantageous  518!
inequity: X
2
2 = 1.14, P = 0.566).   519!
In contrast, for the unequal reward allocations, children’s decisions did vary by  520!
experiment.  The  interaction  between  Age  group  and  Experiment  was  a  significant  521!
predictor of children’s decision in both the disadvantageous inequity and advantageous  522!
inequity  conditions  (disadvantageous  inequity:  X
2
2  =  30.03,  P  <  0.001;  advantageous  523!
inequity: X
2
2 = 7.26, P = 0.027). Figure 4b and 4d illustrate these interactions. In the  524!
disadvantageous  inequity  condition,  children  in  all  age  groups  rejected  unequal  525!
allocations more often in the social than the nonsocial version of the Inequity Game. In  526!
the advantageous inequity condition, 8&9-year-old children rejected unequal offers (4-1)  527!
more often in the social game than in the nonsocial game. However, 4&5- and 6&-7- 528!
year-olds’  rejections  of  unequal  reward  allocations  in  the  advantageous  inequity  529!
condition did not differ between social and nonsocial contexts.   530!
  531!
Discussion  532!
There are three major findings from Experiment 2. First, 4- to 9-year-old children tended  533!
to reject disadvantageous inequity allocations in a nonsocial situation. To our knowledge,  534!
this  is  the  first  study  to  demonstrate  that  children  will  reject  inequity  in  a  nonsocial  535!! 19!
version of a reward distribution game. Second, 4- to 9-year-old children tended to reject  536!
disadvantageous inequity significantly more often when they were playing with a social  537!
partner  than  when  they  were  playing  the  nonsocial  game.  Third,  whereas  younger  538!
children accepted advantageous inequity allocations in both the nonsocial and the social  539!
versions of the game, 8&9-year-old children rejected advantageous allocations only when  540!
they were paired with a social partner.   541!
  The fact that children in a nonsocial game often rejected disadvantageous inequity  542!
allocations  suggests  that  their  rejections  in  the  social  version  of  this  game  were  not  543!
motivated purely by an aversion to having a smaller payoff than a social partner (i.e.,  544!
envy).  Rather,  in  both  nonsocial  and  social  contexts,  children  may  have  rejected  545!
disadvantageous inequity allocations in part because their payoff was relatively less than  546!
other potential payoffs. Rejections of disadvantageous inequity allocations in a nonsocial  547!
context are thus consistent with the Nonsocial Hypothesis that inequity aversion is built  548!
on a heuristic for gauging the relative value of one’s payoff compared to an expected  549!
payoff  (e.g.  reference-dependence)  [33-35,  45].  In  the  disadvantageous  inequity  550!
condition,  children  may  have  been  comparing  their  allocations  of  Skittles  to  other  551!
available allocations (i.e. they are comparing their single skittle to the possible allocation  552!
of  four  Skittles)  regardless  of  whether  another  individual  was  benefiting  from  the  553!
differential payoff distribution. However, this reference-dependence explanation cannot  554!
fully  account  for  children’s  rejections  in  the  social  game  because  rejections  were  555!
significantly higher there than in the nonsocial version of the game.  Thus, nonsocial  556!
influences  partially  explain  disadvantageous  inequity  aversion  in  children,  but  the  557!
presence  of  a  social  partner  increases  children’s  aversion  to  disadvantageous  reward  558!
distributions.  559!
In  contrast  to  the  disadvantageous  condition,  results  from  the  advantageous  560!
inequity  condition  show  that  children  only  rejected  advantageous  allocations  when  561!
playing the social version of the task: they accepted advantageous inequity allocations in  562!
the nonsocial task. This highlights that advantageous inequity aversion is a genuinely  563!
social  phenomenon  and  cannot  be  explained  by  nonsocial  reference-dependence.  564!
Moreover,  this  finding  provides  further  evidence  for  the  notion  that  disadvantageous  565!! 20!
inequity and advantageous inequity aversion follow different developmental pathways  566!
and hence may be underpinned by different psychological mechanisms.   567!
       568!
General Discussion  569!
Combined, these two experiments provide a detailed picture of how social influences  570!
affect  children’s  decisions  about  unequal  payoffs.  Experiment  1  demonstrated  that  571!
children were not using rejections as a means of eliciting more favorable distributions  572!
from the experimenter and, thus, that the main social interaction in the Inequity Game  573!
was  between  the  decider  and  their  social  partner.  Experiment  2  showed  that  social  574!
partners influenced how children reacted to inequity, although their importance varied  575!
depending on the form of inequity. An aversion to advantageous inequity is clearly a  576!
specifically  social  phenomenon;  8&9-year-old  children  only  rejected  advantageous  577!
inequity when a partner was present. Disadvantageous inequity aversion, on the other  578!
hand, has an important nonsocial component; children in all age groups rejected some  579!
disadvantageous  inequity  allocations  in  the  absence  of  a  social  partner.  Importantly,  580!
however,  disadvantageous  inequity  aversion  is  influenced  by  social  context;  children  581!
rejected  more  disadvantageous  inequity  allocations  in  the  social  game  than  in  the  582!
nonsocial game.   583!
In Experiment 1, the experimenter’s intentional delivery of unequal allocations  584!
had no effect on children’s decisions, suggesting that the main social interaction in the  585!
task was between decider and recipient rather than between the decider and experimenter.  586!
Moreover, this demonstrates that rejections in the Inequity Game were not attempts to  587!
influence the experimenter’s reward allocations but were based instead on the relative  588!
rewards at stake. Additionally, Experiment 1 provides an independent replication of the  589!
age-shift  reported  in  Blake  and  McAuliffe  [14]  with  8&9-year-old  children  rejecting  590!
advantageous allocations when playing the Inequity Game with a social partner.  591!
The results of Experiment 2 provided support for the idea that advantageous and  592!
disadvantageous  inequity  aversion  are  supported  by  two  different  cognitive  processes  593!
[14, 18].  Specifically, 8&9-year-olds rejected advantageous offers only if there was a  594!
social partner who would get less than them; children at this age accepted advantageous  595!
offers  in  the  nonsocial  version.    These  results  are  consistent  with  the  idea  that  596!! 21!
advantageous  inequity  aversion  evolved  for  social  interactions  and  is  not  based  on  597!
domain-general mechanisms. 
  598!
Results from the disadvantageous inequity conditions, on the other hand, suggest  599!
that  both  social  and  nonsocial  factors  might  contribute  to  disadvantageous  inequity  600!
aversion. In Experiment 2, 4- to 9-year-old children rejected disadvantageous inequity  601!
allocations at significant levels even when no peer would receive the larger reward. The  602!
fact  that  children  in  the  nonsocial  game  would  rather  have  nothing  than  accept  a  603!
relatively small reward suggests that disadvantageous inequity aversion in children has an  604!
important nonsocial component. This result is surprising in light of work on adults where  605!
it is generally assumed that inequity aversion is a specifically social phenomenon and,  606!
thus, nonsocial tests are not typically conducted (see Sanfey et al. [36] for an exception).  607!
Although  there  are  clearly  important  social  influences  on  disadvantageous  608!
inequity aversion in children, disadvantageous inequity aversion does not appear to be  609!
triggered exclusively by interactions with a social partner. Rather, our results suggest  610!
that, unlike advantageous inequity aversion, disadvantageous inequity aversion may be  611!
built on a simpler domain-general process like reference-dependence [33-35], which is  612!
consistent with the Nonsocial Hypothesis for the evolution of inequity aversion. Future  613!
work  is  necessary  to  understand  the  specific  mechanisms  that  underpin  rejections  of  614!
disadvantageous inequity allocations in a nonsocial task, but, minimally, we can conclude  615!
from  our  results  that  it  may  be  necessary  to  revise  the  commonly  held  view  that  616!
individuals  only  reject  disadvantageous  allocations  in  order  to  influence  a  partner’s  617!
payoff. Furthermore, our results suggest that envy alone cannot account for rejections of  618!
disadvantageously unequal allocations. More broadly, we argue that a productive area for  619!
future  work  would  be  (1)  to  understand  why  advantageous  inequity  aversion  is  620!
specifically social while disadvantageous inequity aversion is not and (2) to develop a  621!
theory  for  the  evolution  of  inequity  aversion  that  can  account  for  this  important  622!
dissociation by integrating the Social and Nonsocial hypotheses. Such an approach will  623!
also be instrumental in creating ties between studies of inequity across human adults,  624!
children and nonhuman animals.   625!
  Rejections of unequal allocations in the nonsocial game represent an intriguing  626!
similarity with nonhuman animal work where individuals commonly reject inequitable  627!! 22!
allocations in nonsocial controls [19-21, 24-26]. While results from Experiment 2 cannot  628!
speak directly to the evolutionary origin of inequity aversion in humans, they suggest at  629!
least two plausible explanations. First, it is possible that inequity aversion is indeed a  630!
purely social phenomenon in humans and rejections in the absence of a social partner are  631!
a misapplication of this aversion. In line with this hypothesis, children in our sample may  632!
have acquired an expectation about equity in the social domain and have erroneously  633!
applied this expectation to the nonsocial task. Alternatively, inequity aversion in humans  634!
may be built on domain-general mechanisms that are shared with nonhuman species [34]  635!
and that is enhanced by social context. In line with this view, children perceive their  636!
payoff of one Skittle as less desirable when it is distributed alongside of a payoff of 4  637!
Skittles compared to when it is alongside of a payoff of 1 Skittle. Children may react  638!
aversively to this payoff asymmetry regardless of whether it is benefiting a peer, but their  639!
reactions to inequity are strongest when a peer benefits from the asymmetry. At present,  640!
we are unable to distinguish between these alternatives but view them as fruitful areas for  641!
future inquiry.  642!
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether the critical social interaction in the  643!
Inequity Game is between decider and experimenter or between decider and recipient.  644!
We  tested  this  by  asking  whether  children  were  rejecting  unequal  allocations  in  the  645!
Inequity  Game  in  order  to  elicit  more  favorable  distributions  from  the  experimenter.  646!
Results  from  this  study  show  that  deciders  did  not  distinguish  between  unequal  647!
allocations  that  were  deliberately  versus  randomly  generated  by  the  experimenter,  648!
suggesting that children were most likely not attempting to influence the experimenter  649!
with  rejections.  Further  evidence  in  support  of  the  idea  that  children  did  not  reject  650!
unequal allocations in order to influence the experimenter comes from the finding that  651!
there was a difference in levels of rejections in the nonsocial and social versions of the  652!
Inequity Game. If children’s rejections in the game were solely motivated by a desire to  653!
influence the experimenter, we would not expect to see this difference. Given these two  654!
lines of reasoning, we argue that the relevant social interaction in the Inequity Game is  655!
between decider and recipient and that children show high levels of rejection in the social  656!
version of the Inequity Game, most likely because they are attempting to affect their  657!
social partner’s payoff through rejections.   658!! 23!
More  broadly,  the  results  from  Experiment  1  have  important  methodological  659!
implications because they demonstrate that children’s behavior in the Inequity Game is  660!
not driven by their desire to influence the experimenter. Given that almost all studies of  661!
inequity aversion in children are done in the presence of an experimenter, this may help  662!
alleviate  concerns  about  experimenter  effects  and  substantiate  the  interpretation  that  663!
children’s decisions in these tasks result from their interaction with a peer.   664!
  Social influences are undoubtedly important in the expression of inequity aversion  665!
in children, and this is especially true for advantageous inequity aversion. However, there  666!
are also important nonsocial factors at play, as was evidenced by children’s rejections of  667!
disadvantageous allocations in the nonsocial game. Thus, our results begin to paint a  668!
more nuanced picture of the emergence of inequity aversion in children. Understanding  669!
the  social  factors  that  influence  the  expression  of  inequity  aversion  is  critical  to  670!
understanding its evolution and development but, to date, few studies have tested these  671!
influences empirically. Examining the social factors that influence inequity aversion in  672!
children and adults will help unite human inequity aversion studies with inequity aversion  673!
studies  in  nonhuman  animals  and  will  help  shed  light  on  the  evolutionary  and  674!
developmental processes that shape inequity aversion in humans.   675!
676!! 24!
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Tables  800!
  801!
Table 1. Description of predictor variables used in analyses of children’s decisions to  802!
accept or reject reward allocations in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  803!
  804!
Condition  Fixed effect with two levels: disadvantageous inequity, advantageous 
inequity 
Distribution  Fixed effect with two levels: equal (1-1), unequal (disadvantageous 
inequity: 1-4 or advantageous inequity: 4-1) 
Age group  Fixed effect with three levels: 4&5, 6&7, 8&9 
Decider gender  Fixed effect with two levels: male, female 
Origin
1  Fixed effect with two levels: deliberate, random 
Order
1  Fixed effect with two levels: deliberate block first, random block first 
Order
2  Fixed effect with two levels: equal block first, unequal block first 
  805!
1 Variable is unique to Experiment 1
  806!
2 Variable is unique to Experiment 2    807!! 30!
Figure Legends  808!
  809!
Figure 1. Photograph of apparatus used in these studies. Deciders sat on the left side of  810!
the apparatus and could operate the handles while the partner (if present) sat on the right  811!
side of the apparatus. Pulling the green handle caused the trays to tip outwards, delivering  812!
candies to the two outside bowls (“accepting an offer”). Pulling the red handle caused the  813!
trays to tip inwards, delivering candy to the inside bowl (“rejecting an offer”).  814!
  815!
Figure 2. Proportion of reward allocations rejected in Experiment 1, in which reward  816!
allocations were either generated deliberately by the experimenter or randomly generated  817!
by a deck of cards. Rejections are shown for the disadvantageous inequity condition (A)  818!
and the advantageous inequity condition (B). Participants were assigned either to the  819!
disadvantageous  inequity  condition  (N  =  64  pairs)  or  to  the  advantageous  inequity  820!
condition (N = 60 pairs). In the disadvantageous inequity condition, participants received  821!
one piece of candy while either one piece (equal distribution) or four pieces (unequal  822!
distribution) were placed on the recipient’s side of the apparatus. In the advantageous  823!
inequity condition, participants received either one piece of candy (equal distribution) or  824!
four pieces (unequal distribution) while one piece was placed on the recipient’s side of  825!
the  apparatus.  In  both  the  disadvantageous  inequity  and  advantageous  inequity  826!
conditions, participants received three of each trial type: 1) deliberate equal; 2) random  827!
equal; 3) deliberate unequal and 4) random unequal. Error bars represent 95% confidence  828!
intervals.  829!
  830!
Figure  3.  Proportion  of  reward  allocations  rejected  in  Experiment  2,  the  nonsocial  831!
version of the Inequity Game. Rejections are shown for the disadvantageous inequity  832!
condition (A) and the advantageous inequity condition (B). Participants were assigned  833!
either to the disadvantageous inequity condition (N = 98) or to the advantageous inequity  834!
condition (N = 103). In the disadvantageous inequity condition, participants received one  835!
piece  of  candy  while  either  one  piece  (equal  distribution)  or  four  pieces  (unequal  836!
distribution) were placed on the other side of the apparatus. In the advantageous inequity  837!
condition, participants received either one piece of candy (equal distribution) or four  838!! 31!
pieces  (unequal  distribution)  while  one  piece  was  placed  on  the  other  side  of  the  839!
apparatus. In both the disadvantageous inequity and advantageous inequity conditions,  840!
participants  received  six  equal  and  six  unequal  trials.  Error  bars  represent  95%  841!
confidence intervals.  842!
  843!
Figure 4. Proportions of reward allocations rejected in Experiments 1 (social) and 2  844!
(nonsocial). Rejections are shown for the disadvantageous inequity condition (A and B)  845!
and  the  advantageous  inequity  condition  (C  and  D).  Within  condition,  rejections  are  846!
shown by equal distribution (1-1, A and C) and unequal distribution (1-4 of 4-1, B and  847!
D). Participants were assigned either to the disadvantageous inequity condition or to the  848!
advantageous inequity condition. Within condition, participants received six equal trials  849!
and six unequal trials. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  850!
    851!! 32!
Supporting Information Legends  852!
  853!
Table S1.   854!
Number of children who participated in Experiments 1 and 2.  855!
  856!
Table S2.   857!
GLMM output: participants’ decisions in the disadvantageous and advantageous inequity  858!
conditions of Experiment 1.  859!
  860!
Table S3.   861!
GLMM output: participants’ decisions in the disadvantageous and advantageous inequity  862!
conditions of Experiment 2.  863!
  864!
Table S4.   865!
GLMM  output:  participants’  decisions  in  the  disadvantageous  inequity  (DI)  and  866!
advantageous inequity (AI) conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 combined.  867!
  868!
Table S5.   869!
GLMM output: decisions in the disadvantageous and advantageous inequity conditions of  870!
Experiment  1  for  participants  who  spontaneously  answered  the  randomization  871!
comprehension questions correctly.  872!
  873!
Figure S1.   874!
Picture of cards used in Experiment 1 to randomly generate offers.  875!
  876!
Figure S2.  877!
Line plots showing the interaction between decider gender and distribution in the  878!
disadvantageous inequity condition of Experiment 1.  879!
  880!
Figure S3.   881!! 33!
Probability of reward allocation rejection over trials in Experiment 2, the nonsocial  882!
version of the inequity game.  883!
  884!
Figure S4.  885!
Proportion  of  reward  allocations  rejected  in  Experiment  1  by  participants  who  886!
spontaneously answered the randomization comprehension questions correctly.  887!McAuliffe et al. Social influences on inequity aversion in children 
Supporting Information (SI) 
!
 
Table S1. Number of children who participated in Experiments 1 and 2. Table shows 
numbers  of  deciders  by  Experiment,  Condition  (DI  Disadvantageous  Inequity,  AI 
Advantageous Inequity), Age Group, and Decider Gender (F Female, M Male). 
 
 
4&5  6&7  8&9 
Total 




DI  7  13  10  14  9  11  64 
AI  12  9  10  9  11  9  60 
Experiment 2: 
Nonsocial   DI  22  20  23  13  10  10  98 
AI  19  18  13  22  20  11  103 
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Table S2. Output from minimal generalized linear mixed model of participants’ decisions 
in  the  disadvantageous  and  advantageous  inequity  conditions  of  Experiment  1. 
Coefficients indicate the estimated effects of predictors on the response term (accept = 1, 
reject = 0) relative to the following baseline levels: Distribution = equal; Age group = 
4&5-year-old; Decider gender = female. 
 
Experiment 1      β  s.e.   z   p 
Disadvantageous 
Inequity    Intercept  3.43  0.69  5.00  < 0.001 
  Distribution  Unequal  -3.55  0.68  -5.24  < 0.001 
  Age group  6&7-year-olds  1.3  0.77  1.68  0.092 
    8&9-year-olds  2.47  1.28  1.93  0.054 
  Decider 
gender  Male  -1.01  0.76  -1.33  0.183 
  Distribution x 
Age group  Unequal x 6&7-year-olds  -3.58  0.78  -4.61  < 0.001 
    Unequal x 8&9-year-olds  -4.25  1.28  -3.33  < 0.001 
  Distribution x 
Decider 
gender  Unequal x Male  1.62  0.76  2.14  0.032 
Advantageous 
Inequity    Intercept  3.02  0.47  6.47  < 0.001 
  Distribution  Unequal  0.59  0.58  1.01  0.311 
  Age group  6&7-year-olds  -0.89  0.62  -1.45  0.148 
    8&9-year-olds  -0.46  0.63  -0.74  0.460 
  Distribution x 
Age group  Unequal x 6&7-year-olds  -0.51  0.7  -0.73  0.466 
    Unequal x 8&9-year-olds  -2.5  0.69  -3.60  < 0.001 
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Table S3. Output from minimal generalized linear mixed model of participants’ decisions 
in  the  disadvantageous  and  advantageous  inequity  conditions  of  Experiment  2. 
Coefficients indicate the estimated effects of predictors on the response term (accept = 1, 
reject = 0) relative to the following baseline levels: Distribution = equal; Age group = 
4&5-year-old; Order = Equal block first. 
 
Experiment 2      β  s.e.   z   p 
Disadvantageous 
Inequity    Intercept  2.68  0.29  9.25  <0.001 
  Distribution  Unequal  -1.18  0.28  -4.25  <0.001 
  Age group  6&7-year-olds  0.07  0.43  0.16  0.876 
    8&9-year-olds  -0.01  0.51  -0.03  0.978 
  Distribution x 
Age group  Unequal x 6&7-year-olds  -1.28  0.41  -3.13  0.002 
    Unequal x 8&9-year-olds  -0.63  0.48  -1.3  0.193 
Advantageous 
Inequity    Intercept  2.67  0.24  11.15  <0.001 
  Order  Unequal block first  -0.88  0.32  -2.78  0.005 
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Table S4. Output from generalized linear mixed model of participants’ decisions in the 
disadvantageous  inequity  (DI)  and  advantageous  inequity  (AI)  conditions.  Separate 
models were run to examine participants’ decisions in a social context (Experiment 1) 
compared to a nonsocial context (Experiment 2). Models examined participants decisions 
about equal reward allocations (1-1) or unequal reward allocations (DI: 1-4; AI: 4-1) 
Coefficients indicate the estimated effects of predictors on the response term (accept = 1, 
reject = 0) relative to the following baseline levels: Social or nonsocial = nonsocial; Age 
group = 4&5-year-olds). 
      β  s.e.   z   p 
DI: Unequal    Intercept  1.63  0.29  5.59  p < 0.001 
  Social or nonsocial  Social  -1.91  0.50  -3.82  p < 0.001 
  Age group  6&7-year-olds  -1.37  0.42  -3.28  0.001 
    8&9-year-olds  -0.69  0.50  -1.39  0.166 
  Social or nonsocial 
x Age group 
Unequal x 6&7-
year-olds 





2.70  0.77  3.51  0.000 
DI: Equal    Intercept  3.21  0.40  7.95  p < 0.001 
  Social or nonsocial  Social  -6.60  0.73  -8.98  p < 0.001 
  Age group  6&7-year-olds  0.12  0.60  0.20  0.845 
    8&9-year-olds  0.13  0.72  0.18  0.859 
  Social or nonsocial 
x Age group 
Unequal x 6&7-
year-olds 





-2.62  1.84  -1.43  0.154 
AI: Unequal    Intercept  2.93  0.55  5.34  p < 0.001 
  Social or nonsocial  Social  -8.31  1.31  -6.33  p < 0.001 
  Age group  6&7-year-olds  1.12  0.85  1.32  0.188 
    8&9-year-olds  0.92  0.88  1.04  0.298 
  Social or nonsocial 
x Age group 
Unequal x 6&7-
year-olds 





3.38  1.63  2.07  0.039 
AI: Equal    Intercept  2.26  0.32  6.99  p < 0.001 
  Social or nonsocial  Social  -5.44  0.61  -8.88  p < 0.001 
  Age group  6&7-year-olds  -0.05  0.46  -0.10  0.920 
    8&9-year-olds  -0.29  0.47  -0.62  0.535 
  Social or nonsocial 
x Age group 
Unequal x 6&7-
year-olds 





0.58  0.86  0.68  0.498 
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Table S5. Output from minimal generalized linear mixed model of participants’ decisions 
in  the  disadvantageous  and  advantageous  inequity  conditions  of  Experiment  1.  Table 
shows results for only those participants who spontaneously answered the randomization 
comprehension  questions  correctly.  Coefficients  indicate  the  estimated  effects  of 
predictors on the response term (accept = 1, reject = 0) relative to the following baseline 
levels: Distribution = equal; Age group = 4&5-year-old; Decider gender = female. 
 
Experiment 1      β  s.e.   z   p 
Disadvantageous 
Inequity    Intercept  4.86  1.12  4.35  < 0.001 
  Distribution  Unequal  -5.53  1.11  -4.97  < 0.001 
  Age group  6&7-year-olds  -0.09  1.28  -0.07  0.943 
    8&9-year-olds  0.78  1.64  0.47  0.636 
  Decider 
gender  Male  -0.71  1.23  -0.57  0.567 
  Distribution x 
Age group  Unequal x 6&7-year-olds  -2.51  1.27  -1.97  0.049 
    Unequal x 8&9-year-olds  -2.76  1.62  -1.70  0.088 
  Distribution x 
Decider 
gender  Unequal x Male  1.99  1.24  1.60  0.109 
Advantageous 
Inequity    Intercept  2.80  0.47  5.90  < 0.001 
  Distribution  Unequal  0.47  0.59  0.80  0.424 
  Age group  6&7-year-olds  -0.82  0.61  -1.34  0.179 
    8&9-year-olds  -0.46  0.63  -0.74  0.462 
  Distribution x 
Age group  Unequal x 6&7-year-olds  -0.39  0.71  -0.56  0.578 
    Unequal x 8&9-year-olds  -2.36  0.70  -3.37  < 0.001 
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Figure S1.  
Picture  of  cards  used  in  Experiment  1  to  randomly  generate  offers.  The  black  circle 
indicates  the  decider’s  reward  allocation.  From  left  to  right,  cards  show  an  equal 
allocation  (1-1),  a  disadvantageous  inequity  allocation  (1-4)  and  an  advantageous 
inequity allocation (4-1). McAuliffe et al. Social influences on inequity aversion in children 




Line plots showing the interaction between decider gender and distribution in the 
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Figure S3.  
Probability  of  reward  allocation  rejection  over  trials  in  Experiment  2,  the  nonsocial 
version  of  the  inequity  game.  Rejections  are  shown  across  age  groups  for  the 
disadvantageous inequity condition (top row) and the advantageous inequity condition 
(bottom row). Participants were assigned either to the disadvantageous inequity condition 
(N = 98) or to the advantageous inequity condition (N = 103). In the disadvantageous 
inequity condition, participants received one piece of candy while either one piece (equal 
distribution) or four pieces (unequal distribution) were placed on the other side of the 
apparatus. In the advantageous inequity condition, participants received either one piece 
of candy (equal distribution) or four pieces (unequal distribution) while one piece was 
placed  on  the  other  side  of  the  apparatus.  In  both  the  disadvantageous  inequity  and 
advantageous inequity conditions, participants received six equal trials and six unequal 
trials. 
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Figure S4. Proportion of reward allocations rejected in Experiment 1 by participants who 
spontaneously answered the randomization comprehension questions correctly. 
!
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